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ROB^RT^f. McRAE
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four
copies of the foregoing to the following on this
April, 1992.
-4-

f
/

day of

Mr. R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General
Mr. David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

R<PERT M. MCRAE

ADDENDUM A

TOMMY CAGE, Petitioner
v
LOUISIANA
498 US —, 112 L Ed 2d 339, 111 S Q

^

[No. 89-7302]
Decided November 13, 1990.
Decision: Instruction in Louisiana homicide trial defining "reasonable
doubt" in terms of "grave" or "substantial" uncertainty and of need for
"moral certainty" held to violate due process clause.
SUMMARY

In a Louisiana trial court, a defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death after the jury was instructed, in part, that it
must acquit the defendant if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to any
element necessary to constitute his guilt, but that this doubt must be such
"as would give rise to a grave uncertainty" and must be "an actual
substantial doubt," and that what is required is "a moral certainty." On
appeal, the defendant contended that this instruction was improper; but the
Supreme Court of Louisiana—wrhile noting that the phrases "grave uncertainty" and "moral certainty," if taken out of context, might overstate the
requisite degree of uncertainty and confuse the jury—determined that,
taking the instructions as a whole, reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence would understand the definition of reasonable doubt (554 So 2d 39).
Granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and granting certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana and remanded the case for further proceedings. In a per
curiam opinion expressing the unanimous view of the court, it was held that
the instruction violated the reasonable doubt requirement protected by the
due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment,
because (1) the words "substantial" and "grave," as they are commonly
understood, suggested a higher degree of doubt than was required for
acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard, and (2) when those statements were considered with the reference to "moral certainty," rather than
evidentiary certainty, it became clear that a reasonable juror could have
339
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112 L Ed 2d

interpreted the instructions to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of
proof below that required by the due process clause.
HEADNOTES
Classified to U.S Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers* Edition

Appeal §§910.6, 951, 1692.3; Constitutional Law §§ 840.3, 845 —
due process — burden of
proof — jury instructions —
in forma pauperis proceedings — grant of certiorari —
remand
la-lc. With respect to a state appellate court decision affirming an
individual's conviction for first-degree murder, the United States Supreme Court will (1) grant the individual leave to proceed in forma

pauperis; (2) grant the individual's
petition for a writ of certiorari; and
(3) reverse the state appellate court's
judgment, and remand the case for
further proceedings, on the ground
that the state trial court's instruction to the jury explaining the requirement that the individual's guilt
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
—which instruction stated in part
that a "reasonable" doubt must be
such "as would give rise to a grave
uncertainty" and must be "an actual

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY* REFERENCES
21A Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §782; 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial
§§ 756, 827-842
9 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Criminal Procedure §§22 859,
22 860
7 Federal Procedural Forms, L Ed, Criminal Procedure
§ 20.933
8 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Criminal Procedure, Form
358
USCS, Constitution, Amendment 14
US L Ed Digest, Appeal §§ 910.6, 951, 1692 3; Constitutional
Law § 840 3, 845
Index to Annotations, Due Process; Instructions to Jury;
Presumptions and Burden of Proof
Auto-Cite*: Cases and annotations referred to herein can be
further researched through the Auto-Cite* computer-assisted research service. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for
form, parallel references, prior and later history, and annotation references.
ANNOTATION REFERENCE
Supreme Court's views as to prejudicial effect in criminal case of
erroneous instructions to jury involving burden of proof or presumptions.
92 L Ed 2d 862
340
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substantial doubt," and that what
was required was "a moral certainty"—is invalid under the due
process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, because (a) the words "substantial"
and "grave," as they are commonly
understood, suggest a higher degree
of doubt than is required for acquitted under the reasonable doubt standard, and (b) when those statements
are considered with the reference to
"moral certainty," rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear
that a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the instruction to p^ow
a finding of guilt based on * degree
of proof below that r^aired by the
due process clause
Constitution** Law § &40.3 — due
pror*&s — burden of proof
2 In state criminal trials, the due

process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he
or she is charged.
Appeal § 1258 — principles of review — jury induction
3. In c o n s ^ ^ g a state trial
court's induction to the jury in a
murd*' ^ a l ^ t° the meaning of
tw requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, in order to determine whether that instruction met
the requirements of tW> due process
clause of the Federal Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment, the "United
States Supreme Court will consider
how reasonable jurors could have
understood the charge as a whole.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.
[1a] The motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
[2] In state criminal trials, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged."
Ir^re Winship, 397 US 358, 364, 25 L
K T S O S S T ^ S a 1068 (1970); see
also Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307,
315-316, 61 L Ed 2d 560, 99 S a
2781 (1979). This reasonable doubt
standard "plays a vital role in the
American scheme of criminal procedure." Winship, 397 US, at 363, 25 L
Ed 2d 368, 90 S Ct 1068. Among
other things, tf[i]t is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error." Ibid.

The issue before us is whether the
reasonable doubt instruction in this
case complied with Winship.
Petitioner was convicted in a Louisiana trial court of first-degree murder, and was sentenced to death. He
appealed to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, arguing, inter alia, that
the reasonable doubt instruction
used in the guilt phase of his trial
was constitutionally defective. The
instruction provided in relevant
part:
"If you entertain a reasonable
doubt as to any fact or element
necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give
him the benefit of that doubt and
return a verdict of not guilty.
Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it
does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
341
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acquit the accused. This doubt,
however, must be a reasonable
one, that is one that is founded
upon a real tangible substantial
basis and not upon mere caprice
and conjecture. It must be such
doubt as would give rise to a grave
uncertainty, raised in your mind
by reasons of the unsatisfactory
character of the evidence or lack
^hereof. A reasonable doubt is not
a Kio
re possible doubt. It is an
actual b^hstantial doubt It is a
doubt that a reasonable man can
seriously entertain What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral
certainty/' State v Cage 554 5o 2d
39, 41 (La 1989) (emphasis added).
fib] The Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected petitioner's argument.
The court first observed that the use
of the phrase- "grave uncertainty"
and "moral certainty" in the instruction, "if taken out of context,
might overstate the requisite degree
of uncertainty and confuse the jury."
Ibid But "taking the charge as a
whole," the court concluded that
"reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence would understand the definition of 'reasonable doubt' " Ibid It
is our view, however, that the instruction at issue was contrary to
the "beyond a reasonable doubt'1 requirement articulated in Wmship.
• Similar attempts to define reasonable
doubt ha\e been widel) criticized by the Federal Courta of Appeals See, e g, Monk v
Zelez, 901 F2d 885, 889-890 (CA10 1990),
United States v Moss, 756 F2d 32% 333 (CA4

342
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[1c, 3] In construing the instruction, we consider how reasonable
jurors could have understood the
charge as a whole. Francis v Franklin, 471 US 307, 316, 85 L Ed 2d 344,
105 S Ct 1965 (1985). The charge did
at one point instruct that to convict,
guilt must be found beyond a reasonable doubt; but it then equated a
reasonable doubt with a "grave uncertainty" and an "actual substantial doubt," and stated that what
was required was a "moral certainty" that the defendant was
guilty. It is plain to us that the
words "substantial" and "grave," as
they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is
required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard When those
statements are then considered with
the reference to "moral certainty,"
rather than evidentiary certainty, it
becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to &11OT a finding of guilt
based on a degree <d proof below
that required by the Dye Process
Clause *
Accordingly, the judgment of the
Supreme €Wr$ of Louisiana is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceeding not inconsistent
with this opinion
It is so ordered
1985) United States v Indorato, 628 F2d 711,
720-721 (CAl 1980), United States v ByTd, 352
F2d 570, 575 (CA2 1965), see also Taylor v
Kentuck}, 436 US 478, 488, 56 L Ed 2d 468,
96 S a 1930 (1978)
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McRAE & DeLAND

NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
AND ASSIGNMENT TO
RULE 31 CALENDAR

Robert M. McRae, Esq.
209 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Charles Kenneth Montgomery,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 910284-CA

This case has been set for oral argument on Monday, March 30, 1992 at
9:00 a.m. before this court at 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City.
Oral argument is limited to fifteen minutes per side. Following argument, the
case will be submitted for an expedited decision pursuant to Rule 31. If any
or all parties wish to waive oral argument, a written statement to that effect
must be filed in the clerk's office on or before February 19, 1992.
Oral argument will not be continued absent a proper motion and
stipulation of all parties. A motion for continuance will be granted only
upon a showing of exigent circumstances. Specifically, a continuance will not
be granted for reasons of a scheduling conflict, including a previously
scheduled appearance in a lower court. If all parties do not stipulate to the
continuance or if an emergency circumstance is not shown, oral argument will
proceed as herein scheduled.
Counsel, if a party is represented by counsel, or the party must
complete the information requested below and return this notice to the Court
of Appeals no later than February 19, 1992.
This 5th day of February 1992.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

I certify that this case has not been settled, discharged or stayed by
bankruptcy, or otherwise rendered moot. If this case should be settled,
discharged or stayed by bankruptcy, or otherwise rendered moot, I will notify
the Court as soon as possible in accordance with Rule 37, Utah R. App. P. I
understand that failure to take such action may be grounds for sanctions under
Rule 40, U^ah /. App. P. or for contempt of court under UCA 78-32-1 et. seq.

Signature of Attorney of Record

NOTE:

Date

A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Of OPPOSING COUNSEL

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

I

mailed,

postage prepaid, a

copy of the Notice of Oral Argument to Mr. R. Paul Van
Mr.

David

B.

Thompson,

Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT

Attorney
84114

Dam

and

General's Office, 236 State
this

/ day

1992.

ROBERT M. McRAE

of

February,

ADDENDUM C

MAR 3 1 1 9 9 2
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Nrf a r / r : * ccnan
CBark o< \n* Court
Utah CouU ci Appeals

S t a t e of Utah,
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 910284-CA
v.
Charles Montgomery,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Jackson ( jie "'•'!).
This case is before the court pursuant "o Rule 31, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Dated this 3/

day of March, 1992.

Regnal WKG^arff^ Judgrf /
fa&&v>0?rz
Norman H. Jajg^sbn, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April, 1992, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Robert M. McRae
McRae & DeLand
Attorney at Law
209 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
Eighth District Court
148 East Main
Vernal, UT 84078

Trial Ct. No. #9018004 FS.

Honorable Dennis L. Draney
District Court Judge
Uintah County Courthouse
147 East Main
Vernal, UT 84078
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney
General's Office to be delivered to the parties listed below:
R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Kenneth A. Bronston
David B. Thompson
Assistant Attorney General
Governmental Affairs
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Dated this 1st day of April, 1992•

Deputy^Clerk

ADDENDUM D

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

^C/l .
- % - ^ - - - % - - - -

STATE OF UTAH,
^

Plaintiff,

'0

R U L I N G

vs.
CHARLES KENNITH MONTGOMERY,

Case No. 901800004 FS
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, and Motion for Arrested
Judgment are denied. The court rules that the jury instructions now
questioned by the Defendant accurately explained the law applicable
to the case and the responsibility of the jury. Additionally, the
Defendant has not shown by the record that he objected to the
questioned instructions at trial.

DATED this

%rfh

day of May, 1991

BY THE COURT:

DENNIS L. DRANEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

cc: JoAnn B. Stringham

ADDENDUM E

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The status of MOaZ^Qblku, C 1AAUBS K
, USP No.
20706 , OBSCIS No.
59980
came before the UtafTState Board of ^ferdons on the ^th day of August, 1991,
for tne following considerations
ORIGINAL SEARING
c

* 5 ? 0 F COMMITMENT
MANSLAUGHTER

COUjfcar-teE*!
"5 9018OOO4~FS~

JUDGE
DRANEY

EXPIRATION
Cl/04/19%~

01BEE
After the statement of %j^^/<f<axj£

i)

.—^ —

j ^ t ^ ^ r ^ ^

h

&

and the following witnesses,

^~

*

and for good cause appearing, the Board of Pardons made the following decision:
Rescind
^

Begin parole on

2

- ^Mc/^

parole date,
(/~/j?>~f3

»wlth the following special conditions:

r

9S"7/,o?

5t

<^<^^.if

j&t

ttkd parole agreement to add/delet^/iaodify the conditions described above
Terminate sentence (including parole supervision) on
Expiration of sentinca to be effective on _ _ W ^ _ I - _ _ P B
Schedule rehearing for

^

Otner:

The reasons for this decision are identified on the attached page.
At thb discretion of Jthe 6oard of Pai^io|s^this decision is^subject to review
and modification at any time prior to actual release from custody.
By on*er of the Boat"! of Pardons of the State of Utah, I affix my signature on
behalf of the Chairman of the Board this 9th daj of August, 1991*

/&TfTT. HA3K, Chairman

ADDENDUM F

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

w

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
that satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. A
reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful,
or imaginary, because almost everything related to human
affairs is open to some possible doubt.

A reasonable doubt

is one which is real and is based upon reason and one which
reasonable men and women would have upon a consideration of
all the evidence.

It must arise from the evidence or lack of

evidence in the case.
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of
the evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied
of the Defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if
after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding
conviction of Defendant's guilt such as you would be willing
to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating
to your affairs, you have no reasonable doubt.

